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The history of public utility regulation in the United States has an odd
circular quality. During the late nineteenth century, gas and electric com-
panies were subject to limited regulatory oversight; by the early twentieth
century, they were subject to burdensome municipal regulation; and by
1940, most gas and electric companies were subject to state and federal reg-
ulation (Stigler and Friedland 1962; Troesken 1996). Yet during the 1980s
and 1990s, the regulatory bodies that had built up over the previous 100
years were abrogated, and gas and electric companies began operating in
regulatory environments akin to those that had existed in the 1880s and
1890s (Joskow 1989). Similarly, in the American water industry, the gover-
nance regime progressed from private provision with limited municipal
oversight during the nineteenth century to widespread municipal owner-
ship by the mid-twentieth century (Baker 1897; Troesken 1999). During the
1970s and 1980s, municipally owned water companies were privatized by
the score and returned to the governance regime that had prevailed during
the nineteenth century, with private provision and limited municipal over-
sight (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2003; Vitale 2001).
What explains the circularity of public utility regulation? At least three
possibilities suggest themselves. The ﬁrst possibility is that technological
changes altered the viability of alternative governance regimes over time.
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09A1.The second possibility is that ideological changes altered the preferences of
voters and policymakers. During the early twentieth century, these ideo-
logical changes led policymakers to favor state-oriented solutions; by the
late twentieth century, these changes led policymakers to favor market-
oriented solutions. The third possibility appeals to the work of Mancur Ol-
son (1982), who argued that over time institutions tend to ossify and slow
economic growth as entrenched interest groups work to secure a greater
share of society’s resources. Olson’s work suggests that transitions in regu-
latory and governance regimes—whether from market-oriented to statist,
or vice versa—can dramatically improve the operation markets.
I argue that technological and ideological change can only partially ac-
count for the circularity of public utility regulation. Olson’s theory of in-
stitutional ossiﬁcation, which suggests that occasional regime changes are
desirable in public utility markets, provides a more complete explanation.
In developing this line of thought I build on three observations. First, cor-
ruption is endemic to public utility industries; corruption exists, in some
form, across all regulatory and ownership regimes. Second, regime change
in utility industries does not eliminate corruption; it only alters the type of
corruption observed. Third, for any type of governance regime (e.g., state
regulation or municipal ownership) corruption grows increasingly severe
over time and, at some point, becomes politically untenable.
8.2 The Evolution of Public Utility Regulation
The following sections examine public utility regulation in the gas and
electric industries and the water industry.
8.2.1 The Gas and Electric Industries
Regulation in the gas and electric industries evolved in four distinct
phases: the ﬁrst phase (ca. 1850–99) was a period of weak municipal con-
trol, referred to here as franchise regulation; the second phase (ca. 1900–
1909) was a period of aggressive municipal control, referred to here as mu-
nicipal regulation; the third phase (ca. 1907–77) was a period of state reg-
ulation; and the fourth phase (ca. 1978–present) has been characterized by
limited state and municipal control and competition, and in many ways it
mimics the ﬁrst evolutionary phase described here.
In the ﬁrst phase, gas and electric companies were regulated by munici-
pal franchises. Franchises gave utilities the power to dig up streets and op-
erate in particular cities and, in return for these rights, imposed obligations
on the utility in question. Typically franchises were written as long-term
contracts running from twenty to ﬁfty years. These contracts also estab-
lished price ceilings and minimum service thresholds. Franchises often ex-
pressed price ceilings in nominal dollars. Nominal price ceilings, however,
worked poorly because the general price level fell steadily over the nine-
260 Werner Troeskenteenth century and because the technology of producing gas and electric-
ity improved rapidly. These changes drove down the proﬁt-maximizing
price for gas and electricity. Consequently, within a few years of being es-
tablished, price ceilings were typically not binding, even for ﬁrms holding
monopoly positions. For example, Cleveland issued a franchise to the
People’s Gas Light Company in 1867. The franchise prohibited the com-
pany from charging more than $3 per 1,000 cubic feet (MCF), yet by the
early 1870s, the company was charging only $2 MCF (Troesken 1996, pp.
12–15; Wilcox 1910).1
On occasion, cities supplemented their eﬀorts to regulate gas and elec-
tric companies by encouraging competition. In large cities it was not un-
common to have as many as six or seven companies competing with one
another, and there is little question that such competition reduced utility
rates. For example, in Chicago during the late 1880s, competition among
multiple gas companies on the city’s west side drove gas prices down from
$2.25 MCF to $1.00. However, except for very large cities like Chicago and
New York, most markets were not suﬃciently large to support competi-
tion, and even in those places where competitive price wars erupted, eﬀec-
tive competition was short-lived. In Chicago, within a few years of the
aforementioned price wars, all of the city’s competing companies had
merged into a single ﬁrm, and gas rates in the city were increased by 25 per-
cent. The pattern observed in Chicago—competitive price wars followed
by merger and price increases—was also observed in Atlanta, Baltimore,
Buﬀalo, Cleveland, New York, and other large American cities (Troesken
1996, pp. 26–34).
It is important to be clear that municipal franchises were contracts. They
imposed obligations on both the city and the private utility company, and
they required the consent of both parties. City authorities could not uni-
laterally dictate the terms of the franchise. Indeed, in most areas, state con-
stitutions prohibited municipal governments from directly and unilaterally
regulating the rates charged by gas companies and other utilities without
express legislative permission. As one federal court explained, “the regula-
tion of the prices to charge consumers by gas companies is not one of the
powers essential to municipal government, and is not included in general
powers conferred on cities.” The same court went on to explain that unless
the state legislature explicitly granted regulatory powers to city govern-
ments, only the state could regulate gas rates: “and such power cannot be
exercised by a city unless it has been delegated by the state in express words,
or by fair implication from a power expressly granted” (Mills v. City of Chi-
cago, et al., 127 Fed. 731 1904, p. 731).
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1. It was worth noting that in cable television, the regulatory structures adopted by cities
in the late twentieth century were identical to those described here: franchises awarded to
companies who would agree to terms speciﬁed by city oﬃcials. Compare the franchises de-
scribed by Wilcox (1910) to those described by Williamson (1985).The second phase in the evolution of public utility regulation took place
between 1900 and 1909. During this period, many states began to pass laws
authorizing municipal governments to directly regulate the rates charged
by gas and electric companies, as well as other utilities. The states that
passed municipal regulation laws were Arkansas, California, Florida,
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Ohio.
The new municipal regulation laws meant that once a utility company’s
franchise contract with the city expired, city authorities could unilaterally
dictate rates; gas and electric companies did not have to consent to the
rates in order for them to become legally binding. Even in those states that
did not pass these general municipal regulation laws, it was not uncommon
to have the state legislature authorize speciﬁc cities to regulate utility rates.
For example, in 1887 Tennessee authorized the City of Memphis to regu-
late gas rates, subject to the provision that the city never set rates below
$1.50; other cities in the state continued to use municipal franchises to reg-
ulate gas rates.2
State regulation, the third phase in the regulation of gas and electricity,
began in earnest around 1910. However, harbingers of this phase could be
observed as early as 1887, when Massachusetts created a statewide com-
mission to regulate public utilities in the state. Other states that created
state regulatory commissions before 1910 were Georgia (1907), Michigan
(1909), New York (1907), Vermont (1908), and Wisconsin (1907). The
years between 1910 and 1920 witnessed the most rapid growth in state
public utility commissions, with the following twenty-nine states intro-
ducing such commissions: Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming (Stigler and
Friedland 1962; Troesken 1996, pp. 6–17).
Of the phases of regulation discussed thus far, state regulation appears
to have been the most durable and longest lasting. It was not until 1978 that
the fourth phase in the regulatory history of gas and electricity was
reached. In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy
Act. Ostensibly designed to promote renewable energy sources, this law en-
couraged entry into the gas and electric industries across the United States
and according to one authority “demonstrated the viability of competitive
entry into the capital-intensive power generation business” (White 1996,
p. 207). The competition-promoting aspect of this law was furthered when
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Energy Policy Act
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2. See New Memphis Gas & Light Company v. City of Memphis,72 Fed. 952 (1896). See also
Troesken (1997).mandated that the operators of regional transmission networks act as com-
mon carriers and allow unaﬃliated producers to transmit power over their
networks. The economic logic underlying this law was that the transmis-
sion of power had the characteristics of a natural monopoly but that the
production of such power did not. In the years following the Energy Policy
Act, individual states began allowing power consumers to purchase gas
and electricity from any number of competing producers (White 1996).
8.2.2 The Water Industry
The water industry in the United States passed through three regulatory
phases. In the ﬁrst phase (1800–1879) privately owned and operated water
companies were governed by municipal franchises, which, as noted above,
were a weak form of municipal control. The second phase (1880–1970) was
marked by municipal ownership, and private water companies governed by
municipal franchises were replaced by municipally owned enterprises. The
rise of municipal ownership began slowly during the late nineteenth cen-
tury and grew quickly during the early twentieth century. Between 1890
and 1920, the proportion of water companies that were municipally owned
grew from 43 percent to 68 percent. Similarly, between 1880 and 1932 the
number of municipally owned water companies grew from 293 to 7,853
(Troesken 2001).
8.3 Corruption and Other Problems
All of the contractual mechanisms described above—franchise regula-
tion, municipal regulation, state regulatory commissions, and municipal
ownership—are imperfect devices, and each is susceptible to corruption,
rent seeking, and other economic distortions. Understanding how these
problems vary across diﬀerent regulatory regimes is essential if one is to ex-
plain the link between corruption and the circular evolution of public util-
ity regulation.
Before discussing the problems associated with each regulatory regime,
a deﬁnition is in order. For my purposes, corruption refers to the illicitsale
of political inﬂuence. The sale of political inﬂuence can take many forms,
including the following: patronage arrangements (politicians buy votes by
oﬀering plum jobs at above-market wages); political extortion (politicians
can extract bribes from private utility companies by threatening to impose
conﬁscatory regulations and taxes); and industry capture (private utilities
spend resources to make friends with regulators). For these examples of
the deﬁnition of corruption oﬀered above, the word illicitis critical. The act
of selling political inﬂuence is not, in and of itself, corrupt. For example,
through franchise bidding schemes, private utility companies pay for the
right to an exclusive and legally protected market. As long as the fees
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form of reduced taxes or through the provision of public services, this is a
completely legitimate sale of political inﬂuence. The act only becomes cor-
rupt if politicians pocket for themselves some or all of the proceeds of the
sale.
8.3.1 Municipal Franchises
Municipal franchise regulation in many ways mirrored the franchise bid-
ding schemes advocated by Demsetz (1968). Demsetz argued that by auc-
tioning oﬀ the exclusive right to operate in a particular market, local gov-
ernments could secure the beneﬁts of regulation with none of the costs. Ex
ante competition for the franchise, not a costly and corruptible adminis-
trative agency, would govern the behavior of the utility. As long as Dem-
setz’s bidding scheme is fair and open, the utility that won the franchise
would oﬀer rates and service such that the utility would earn zero eco-
nomic proﬁts; price would equal average total cost. This solution is, of
course, second best. A ﬁrst-best solution would force the utility to adopt
marginal-cost pricing and oﬀer the utility a subsidy to compensate for its
losses (Telser 1969, 1971). In an exchange with Telser (1969), Demsetz
(1971) argued that concerns about marginal cost pricing were relatively
unimportant in the context of public utility markets. History suggests
Demsetz was correct on this point; there are much bigger ﬁsh to fry, par-
ticularly those related to corruption.
Franchise bidding schemes are subject to myriad corrupt and ineﬃcient
practices. The most obvious potential source of corruption relates to the
initial sale of the franchise. It is easy to imagine scenarios whereby politi-
cians allow producers to charge rates above average cost and then split the
subsequent excess rents with producers through outright bribes and polit-
ical donations. Diﬀerent forms of corruption can also emerge depending
on the length of the utility’s franchise. Consider the case of a public utility
that is oﬀered a very short franchise, say for ﬁve years. Because the utility’s
assets are much longer lived, when the franchise comes up for renewal there
are potential holdup problems. Politicians, for example, could claim that
the utility failed in some areas of performance and then deny renewal. Lo-
cal politicians could then undervalue the exiting ﬁrm’s capital and split the
rents with the entering ﬁrm, which acquires the capital at bargain rates
(Miller 1993).
8.3.2 Regulatory Commissions
State regulatory commissions are subject to two problems. The ﬁrst
problem is not related to corruption and stems from the mechanics of rate
regulation. State commissions in the United States set utility rates high
enough to allow private utilities to earn a reasonable rate of return on their
capital investments, typically around 8 percent. Rate-of-return regulation
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capital stock so that they will be able to charge higher rates. Jarrell (1979)
presents evidence that, during the mid-twentieth century, privately owned
electric companies that were regulated by state commissions had suspi-
ciously high levels of capital investment. But private utilities need not cook
their books to get favorable treatment; simply by investing more in capital
investments than would unregulated ﬁrms, private utilities are able to se-
cure a more favorable rate base (Averch and Johnson 1962).
The second problem comports with the deﬁnition of corruption oﬀered
above and is the long-standing idea that regulatory commissions are sub-
ject to industry capture. Crudely put, industry capture occurs when regu-
lators get too close to the industry they regulate and begin promoting the
interests of the industry at the expense of broader societal interests. More
formally, one might think of industry capture in the context of the well-
known work by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989). In this
work, administrative agencies (like regulatory commissions) embody a
contract between the legislature that created them and the interest groups
that originally lobbied for them. It is in the interest of the legislature that
creates an administrative agency to make it diﬃcult for subsequent legisla-
tures to undo their legislative actions, which represent a contract with the
interest groups. It is also in the interest of the creating legislature to design
a set of rules so that no matter the political, ideological, or economic back-
ground of the administrators, the agency will reﬂect the needs and wishes
of the interest groups with whom the legislature struck its bargain. When
subsequent legislatures undo the original contract, it is called coalitional
drift. When subsequent administrators undo the original contract, it is
called bureaucratic drift (Macey 1992; Shepsle 1992).
Industry capture is a type of bureaucratic drift. As the word itself con-
notes, capture upsets the original contract between the legislature and the in-
terest groups, and it does so because the regulators get cozy with the indus-
try. The legislature that creates a regulatory commission can try to limit the
amount of coziness through any number of rules. It might, for example, pro-
hibit commissioners from working in the regulated industry for some num-
ber of years after leaving the commission. It might also prohibit commis-
sioners from communicating with industry leaders outside of a narrow set of
oﬃcial channels. But no matter how many rules the legislature makes, there
always exists the possibility that the ideological or economic backgrounds of
future regulators will undo the legislature’s original commitments.3
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3. While historical studies of regulatory commissions provide numerous examples of in-
dustry capture, they also suggest that industry capture is not inevitable. Moreover, to the de-
gree that regulatory commissions have been captured in the past, it is not always producers
who capture them. There are examples of consumers capturing the regulatory apparatus. The
most famous of these is Albro Martin’s (1971) study of farmers and the Interstate Commerce
Commission during the early twentieth century.8.3.3 Municipal Ownership
Municipal ownership is subject to the following three types of problems,
which depending upon one’s perspective might be considered corrupt.
First, the assets of public utilities are long-lived, with distribution systems
lasting 50 to 100 years before they are fully depreciated. Yet the time hori-
zons of local politicians and voters—that is, those who control the assets
under municipal ownership—are relatively short. Politicians come up for
election every few years, and most voters move once or twice in a lifetime.
This means that, confronted with a choice between the long-term viability
of the utility system and an immediate short-term payoﬀ, such as reduced
rates for consumers or well-paying jobs for political supporters, politicians
would invariably choose the short-term payoﬀ. Investments that pay oﬀten
to twenty years down the road are of little use to politicians concerned with
the next election, or for voters with weak ties to the municipality served by
the utility system in question.
The incentive to sacriﬁce the long-term viability of the capital stock for
short-term payoﬀs can be minimized by granting control over investment
and ﬁnance decisions to federal authorities (while most voters move from
town to town, relatively few move from country to country) or by creating
an oversight agency that is immune to short-term political cycles (as are
many state judiciaries). The problem with these solutions is that they are,
by their construction, immune to democratic forces, even though one of
the standard justiﬁcations for public ownership is that it allows for a more
democratic and egalitarian distribution of resources.
A second and related concern is the idea that municipal ownership sup-
ports a giant patronage scheme. In particular, politicians might garner sup-
port by giving away jobs at the local gas and electric companies. Nobody
said it better than George Washington Plunkitt, the inimitable boss of
Tammany Hall (Riordon 1994, p. 78):
Some of the reformers are sayin’ that municipal ownership won’t do be-
cause it would give a lot of patronage to the politicians. How those fel-
lows mix things up when they argue! They’re givin’ the strongest argu-
ment in favor of municipal ownership when they say that. Who is better
ﬁtted to run the railroads and the gas plants and the ferries than the men
who make a business of lookin’ after the interests of the city? Who is
more anxious to serve the city? Who needs the jobs more?
Progressive Era conservatives worried that as the number of municipally
owned utilities grew, so too would the number of municipal employees.
Eventually municipal employees would come to dominate local politics.
“One day,” prophesied Robert Porter, the “unconsidered triﬂes who cluster
round the local authority” would grow into a political “Frankenstein,” a
266 Werner Troeskencollective monster “so huge” that its “creators would not be able to con-
trol” it (Porter 1907, p. 109).4
The third concern with municipal ownership relates to the transition
from private to public ownership. Consider the case of a city trying to pur-
chase a private water company. Because the water company’s capital is
ﬁxed, the city can use its power to regulate and tax strategically to reduce
the water company’s asking price. This diﬃculty is compounded by the fact
that in nearly all situations there is a bilateral monopoly problem: there is
only one seller (the private utility company) and only one buyer (the city).
Of course, to the degree the municipality and the water company anticipate
these diﬃculties, they can devise their primary contracts accordingly and
minimize some of the problems associated with the transition from private
to public ownership. Unfortunately, in practice, it was diﬃcult for parties
to anticipate every possible contingency, and some contracts simply were
not allowed by the courts. Consequently, the actual transition from private
to public ownership has, at least in the United States, frequently resulted in
litigation—during the early twentieth century, about one-third of all at-
tempts by cities to municipalize private water companies in their jurisdic-
tions culminated in litigation (Troesken and Geddes 2003).
8.4 Corruption and Municipal Franchises, 1850–1905
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cities and private
utility companies contracted through municipal franchises. As stated
above, this arrangement mimicked the franchise bidding scheme proposed
by Demsetz (1968). In theory, franchise bidding schemes sounded great. If
the private utility (city) refused to agree to the rate ceiling (limits on regu-
latory authority), the city (private utility) could have turned to another
private company (city) that was more amenable to such promises. Their ac-
tual historical performance was much less satisfactory, however. In prac-
tice, there was a dearth of ﬁrms competing for the right to enter speciﬁc ur-
ban markets, and more seriously, the absence of even a single ﬁrm willing
to enter with only the promise of competitive returns. All potential en-
trants seemed to realize that there were substantial risks of ex post oppor-
tunism, no matter what cities might have promised in writing. Conse-
quently, as compensation for this risk, private ﬁrms generally refused to
enter unless there was a real possibility of recouping most of their invest-
ments within a relatively short time span. This meant that to attract private
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4. Although municipal ownership might have facilitated patronage arrangements, it was
not a prerequisite for patronage. Private utility companies and local politicians could just trade
favors directly: “you hire our friends and political supporters, and we’ll go easy on you the next
time the city sets gas rates.” In describing the situation during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Yearly (1970, pp. 117–18) observes that in return for favors from local
politicians, private utility companies “were obliged to respond not only with cash but also with
places for those who, though deserving, could not be accommodated on the public payroll.”capital, cities typically had to permit utility companies to charge rates at or
near monopoly levels (Troesken 1997; Troesken and Geddes 2003).
The promise of high proﬁts, even it came with risks, was suﬃcient to at-
tract private investors. For monopolistic franchises with few regulatory
constraints, private companies were willing to pay handsomely, and it was
this willingness to pay that helped ﬁnance much corruption. To highlight
the connection between monopolistic franchises and corruption, consider
the following examples. During the early 1900s, in Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, the mayor and multiple members of the city council were implicated,
and eventually convicted, in a scheme to sell a lucrative franchise to a pri-
vate water company. The politicians and the promoters of the water com-
pany were eventually caught, tried, and convicted. Their trials garnered
nationwide attention and were front-page news in cities as far away as
New York and Phoenix. At one point during the trials, at least one defen-
dant tried to bribe jury members to vote against conviction.5
In Chicago in 1894, the promoters of a local railway company spent lav-
ishly to secure passage of a valuable franchise that faced widespread voter
opposition. Four members of the city council received $25,000 each for
their votes in favor of the franchise, and other members of the council re-
ceived $8,000 each for their votes. One particularly important Chicago
politician was said to have received $100,000 for his role in securing pas-
sage of the franchise. W. J. Onahan, for two years the comptroller for the
City of Chicago, believed that all of the bribery and graft associated with
the sale of franchises cost the city millions of dollars that otherwise could
have been used to lower taxes:6
If the city . . . had received proper annual compensation for all the fran-
chises that have been ignorantly and corruptly disposed of for nothing,
Chicago would today have income enough to run its aﬀairs without levy-
ing a dollar of taxation on real estate or personal property....  T h e  s t r e e t
railways, the gas companies, the electric lighting companies, the tele-
phone companies, the water privileges, the dock privileges . . . every one
of these favored interests, which secured their privileges by bribing Al-
dermen and corrupting oﬃcials, ought to [pay] millions in annual trib-
ute to the city.
In St. Louis in 1898, the promoter of a local railway company paid bribes
between $3,000 and $17,500 to local politicians in return for securing a
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5. See Arizona Gazette(Phoenix), December 1, 1903, p. 1, and December 2, 1903, p. 1; and
the following issues of the New York Times: November 15, 1903, p. 2; November 22, 1903,
p. 1; December 1, 1903, p. 1; December 2, 1903, p. 3; and December 27, 1903, p. 2. For some
of the legal issues surrounding the trials of the men convicted in this scheme, see the follow-
ing court cases: People v. Albers, 137 Mich. 678 (1904); People v. Mol, 137 Mich. 692 (1904);
People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316 (1904); and People v. Salsbury, 134 Mich. 537 (1904).
6. The information and quotation in this paragraph are from Stead (1894), pp. 176–77
and 199.franchise to operate in the city. In the end, the promoter paid about
$250,000 in bribe money, none of which was returned to the city. The pro-
moter, however, was eventually convicted and sentenced to ﬁve years in
prison, as were several prominent St. Louis politicians. The same basic
story obtained when St. Louis granted lighting franchises. Once, in the
midst of all this graft and corruption, a newly elected member of the city
council expressed concern that if voters discovered such schemes he and
other politicians might be voted out of oﬃce. His colleagues “laughed”
and “assured him that the political power of the boodlers was too great.”7
The histories of Chicago, St. Louis, and Grand Rapids, while perhaps ex-
ceptional in terms of the richness of the historical record and the detailed
information about the amount of money that changed hands, are repre-
sentative of a much larger pattern of graft and corruption associated with
the granting of franchises to private utility companies.8
8.5 Corruption and Municipal Regulation, 1900–1915
As stated above, during the early twentieth century, many states began
to pass laws authorizing municipal governments to directly regulate the
rates charged by gas and electric companies, as well as other utilities
(Troesken 1997). These new municipal regulation laws meant that once a
utility company’s franchise contract with the city expired, city authorities
could unilaterally dictate rates; gas and electric companies did not have to
consent to the rates in order for them to become legally binding. Although
the political origins of this form of municipal rate regulation have not been
studied extensively, the existing evidence seems to suggest that it was con-
sumers and local politicians who pushed state legislatures to authorize mu-
nicipal governments to regulate utility rates unilaterally (Troesken 1996,
pp. 55–63). Consumers saw municipal regulation as a way to get lower util-
ity rates while local politicians saw it is a way to extract rents from the in-
dustry more eﬀectively. Unfettered municipal rate regulation probably
helped to reduce utility rates to consumers, but it did not eliminate the
presence of corruption, and might have even exacerbated it.
Describing municipal regulation of urban transit systems during the
late twentieth century, Pashigian (1976, p. 1258) writes: “With some ex-
ceptions, the regulatory agencies [at a local level] have been captured not
by the transit ﬁrms of the industry but by the riders.” Observers of the
early twentieth-century gas industry said the same thing. In a speech be-
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7. These events are recounted in an article published by a St. Louis district attorney, Folk
(1903).
8. See, for example, Brown (1905), National Civic Federation (1907), National Municipal
League (1896), Rosewater (1903), Zueblin (1918), and Steﬀens (1964). See also Troesken
(1996, pp. 45–49) for the corruption associated with the granting of gas company franchises
in Chicago.fore the Paciﬁc Gas Association, an oﬃcer of a San Francisco gas com-
pany stated:9
When the time for the regulation of rates arises, a [city] councilman or
supervisor, elected on a platform that calls for a reduction in the gas and
electric rates, is hardly in a proper frame of mind to listen to evidence
and impartially vote thereon. No matter what the evidence is, if he does
not vote for a reduction a large number of citizens, and all of the daily
papers, will accuse him of being biased in favor of the corporation.
Forrest McDonald, biographer of Samuel Insull and noted historian, con-
curs: “At the turn of the century, public utilities were regulated by munici-
pal governments. Such regulation was governed largely by political con-
cerns; shrewd politicians . . . recognized . . . that voters were often inclined
to respond favorably to attacks on utilities” (McDonald 1957, p. 117).
A few examples illustrate the politicized and often corrupt nature of
municipal regulation. In 1905 Illinois granted the Chicago City Council
the authority to regulate gas rates. A few years later, Carter Harrison ranas
a Chicago mayoral candidate. Harrison, and several candidates for city
council, promised that, if elected, they would reduce gas rates in the city
from 85¢ to 70¢. After Harrison and his friends won they launched an in-
vestigation into the costs of manufacturing and distributing gas. The ex-
pert they hired, W. J. Hagenah of the Wisconsin Public Utilities Commis-
sion, recommended a 77¢ rate. According to Hagenah, anything lower
than 77¢ would not allow producers a reasonable rate of return. Chicago
authorities promptly ﬁred Hagenah and hired Edward Bemis. After paying
Bemis ﬁve times the salary they paid Hagenah, Chicago authorities got the
result they wanted. Bemis recommended, and the city eventually passed, a
70¢ rate ordinance. Ironically, earlier in his political career Carter Harri-
son had opposed attempts by the city to regulate gas rates, arguing that the
city would use the power to regulate rates only as a way of “blackmailing”
Chicago gas companies—if the gas companies did not pay oﬀ the city
council, the city would order them to reduce rates (Troesken 1996, pp.
67–73).
On May 4, 1891, the Cleveland City Council passed an ordinance re-
quiring the city’s two gas companies to reduce their rates from $1.00 to
$0.60. The ordinance grew out of a plan launched by Cleveland’s newly
elected mayor. The mayor thought the city paid too much to light streets
and public buildings. He directed several members of the city council to
meet and devise a plan to lower the city’s gas bill. At one of these meetings,
one council member suggested that private consumers also paid too much
for their gas. Someone else said that the price of gas for private consumers
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9. From a speech delivered before the Paciﬁc Gas Association at its annual convention in
the fall of 1908. The speech was reprinted in the American Gas Light Journal, September 28,
1908, p. 527.should be reduced to 60 cents. The other council members agreed that 60
cents was a good rate. Within a few days, and without any investigation
into the costs of manufacturing gas, the council passed an ordinance set-
ting rates at60 cents.10Oﬃcials in other cities exhibited a similarly cavalier
attitude.11
Perhaps the clearest example of outright corruption occurred in San
Francisco. In 1906, ﬁfteen of the city’s sixteen supervisors took bribes from
the Paciﬁc Gas Light and Coke Company in return for reducing not to 75¢
but to 85¢ per 1,000 cubic feet. These supervisors had been elected on the
Union Labor platform which during the preceding election had promised
voters that rates would be reduced to 75¢ (Jacobson 2000, p. 99).
Although substantive due process12protected utility companies from the
most egregious forms of municipal regulation, securing that protection
was neither cheap nor timely. Recall the story about Chicago and the 70¢
gas ordinance. After the city enacted the ordinance, Chicago gas compa-
nies sued for injunctive relief. They claimed, among other things, that 70
cents was a conﬁscatory rate. Litigating in every state and federal court
imaginable, the city and Chicago gas companies battled for nearly two
decades before the gas companies won (Troesken 1996, pp. 71–72). Liti-
gating substantive due process questions took so long, in part, because of
the rules adopted by the courts. For example, the courts granted immedi-
ate injunctive relief only when there was overwhelming evidence that regu-
lators had set conﬁscatory rates. In more ambiguous cases, the courts al-
lowed the rates to go into eﬀect. If after the rates went into eﬀect the
company continued to ﬁnd them conﬁscatory, it could ﬁle another claim.13
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10. The following issues of the Cleveland Leader and Heralddescribe the battle between the
city council and the gas company: May 5, 1891, p. 8; August 11, 1891, p. 8; August 12, 1891,
p. 5; August 25, 1891, p. 8; August 28, 1891, p. 8; November 14, 1891, p. 8; and June 1, 1892,
p. 1.
11. One might ask if the examples from Cleveland and Memphis truly illustrate corrup-
tion. They clearly illustrate bad public policy, but this is not necessarily the same thing as cor-
ruption. What happened in Cleveland and Memphis was corrupt in the following sense. Lo-
cal politicians used gas rates as a way to score short-term political points at the expense of the
longer-term and broader interests of voters in both cities. One might also argue that had vot-
ers been fully aware and informed of the long-term consequences of such capricious regula-
tory behavior they would not have tolerated such actions.
12. Substantive due process, which grew out of the Fourteenth Amendment, protected
private utility companies against conﬁscatory rate regulation—regulation that set rates so
low that ﬁrms could not earn a reasonable rate of return. The famous Reagan and Smyth v.
Ames decisions established the rule: when regulators set rates too low, they violated produc-
ers’ Fourteenth Amendment rights. Reconstructionists intended the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, adopted in 1868, to protect recently emancipated slaves from the ravages of Jim Crow.
As it read, the amendment guaranteed all persons “equal protection of the laws” and forbade
governments from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” Whatever its original purpose, though, by the late nineteenth century, the Fourteenth
Amendment protected all industries against overzealous regulatory policies. See Hovenkamp
(1991) and Troesken (1996), p. 12.
13. See William R. Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Company of New York,29 S. Crt. 192 (1908),
and Des Moines Gas Company v. City of Des Moines, 35 S. Crt. 811 (1914).Municipal rate regulation undermined the long-term viability of private
utilities in much the same way as termites destroy a home: slowly eating
away at unseen support structures. Once local politicians acquired the abil-
ity to regulate utility rates unilaterally, they abused that authority to win
election or extort bribes from private utility companies. This raised the
costs of operating private utilities and discouraged future investment in
utility industries. As Troesken (1996, pp. 74–76) shows, the implementa-
tion of municipal regulation of gas rates in Chicago was associated with a
slowdown in investments in new gas lines in the city. Other studies show
that onerous municipal regulations discouraged capital formation in the
gas and water industries throughout the United States (Troesken 1997;
Troesken and Geddes 2003). In the case of water, underinvestment posed
serious public health risks, leaving cities vulnerable to epidemics of ty-
phoid, cholera, and diarrheal diseases (Troesken 2001).
8.6 Corruption and State Regulation, 1907–70
Between 1907 and 1922, nearly thirty states created statewide commis-
sions to regulate public utilities (Stigler and Friedland 1962; Stotz and
Jamison 1938, p. 450). Legislators created regulatory commissions largely
in response to the lobbying eﬀorts utilities. Utilities lobbied for state regu-
lation because they saw it as a politically expedient way to undermine the
periodic shakedown schemes implemented by local authorities. Testifying
before the Illinois legislature, an oﬃcial of the People’s Gas Light and Coke
Company (of Chicago) pleaded (Chicago Tribune, April 28, 1905, p. 6):
By city regulation you place it in the hands of the people interested to sit
in judgement of their own case. Despite their protestations of fairness
they could not restrain from giving themselves the best of it. Therefore
we fear city regulation....   [W]e do not want to be at the mercy of the
city. Let there be a commission appointed, a state commission appointed
by the governor....   Let this commission examine books and investigate
accounts, let the commission ﬁx rates.
Blackford (1970 and 1977), McDonald (1957, 1958 and 1962) and others
document the same patterns in many other states.
Although utilities supported state regulation because they believed it
would undermine the onerous policies of local regulators, it is important
to be clear that in a perfect world they would have preferred to have been
subject to no rate regulation whatsoever. Furthermore, there is evidence
that consumers and municipal governments played an instrumental role in
shaping the creation of state public utility commissions. Indeed, state com-
missions represented, at least initially, a compromise position among util-
ity companies, local governments, and consumer groups (Troesken 1996,
pp. 79–89). The nature of this compromise was highlighted by the Illinois
272 Werner TroeskenGeneral Assembly (1913, p. 861) when the assembly recommended the cre-
ation of a state regulatory commission:
If municipalities are incapable of protecting their citizens for any reason
from the unjust exactions of public service corporations, it is the duty of
the State to protect them in such a manner it deems right and proper.
Conversely, if the citizens of a municipality, through their representa-
tives, take such action as will destroy or conﬁscate public utility invest-
ments, it is likewise duty of the State to assert its paramount authority to
the end that justice may be accorded to citizens interested in such con-
cerns.
In short, state regulatory commissions were designed to protect the inter-
ests of both consumers and producers from the opportunistic behavior of
competing parties (Goldberg 1976; Troesken 1996).
During the early years of state regulation, it appears that the regulatory
commissions did a reasonably good job balancing the interests of con-
sumers and producers. Existing studies of the eﬀects of utility regulation
during the period from 1915 through 1940 ﬁnd that the commissions kept
rates substantially below their monopoly levels but at the same time not so
low that they were conﬁscatory (see, for example, Troesken 1996, pp. 81–
93, and Twentieth Century Fund 1948).
This early optimism, however, eventually gave way to pessimism, and
since the 1960s a series of studies have emerged suggesting that regulation
during the late twentieth century has been much less eﬀective. In a seminal
paper, Stigler and Friedland (1962) compared electric rates in states with
and without state utility commissions; their data come from the early twen-
tieth century when regulatory regimes varied across space. Stigler and
Friedland found that rates and proﬁts were not signiﬁcantly lower in states
with utility commissions. From this, they concluded that state regulation
allowed utility companies to charge high rates and earn monopoly proﬁts.
Similarly, Moore (1970) estimates demand and cost equations to isolate the
eﬀects of regulation. Moore uses a cross section of electric utilities operat-
ing in 1962. He ﬁnds that state regulation lowered rates from monopoly lev-
els by only 3 percent.14
The evolution suggested by the extant literature is that state utility regu-
lation grew increasingly pro-producer over time and that state commis-
sions gradually came to be captured by the interests of private utility com-
panies. Although the origins of the deregulation movement of the late
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14. A study by Meyer and Leland (1980) is slightly more sanguine and ﬁnds that state reg-
ulation can, in some cases, have a substantial eﬀect on utility rates. Meyer and Leland pool
data from forty-eight states over the period 1969 through 1974. These data, and the estimat-
ing procedure used, allow for the possibility that the eﬀectiveness of regulation varies over
time and across space. Allowing for this possibility distinguishes Meyer and Leland’s study
from earlier work. They ﬁnd “pervasive diﬀerences” in “regulatory impact across states.” In
a few states, state regulation signiﬁcantly reduced utility rates; in other states it did not.1970s and early 1980s remain puzzling to many students of political econ-
omy (e.g., Peltzman 1989), one possibility is that industry capture and cor-
ruption became too costly to be sustained and that deregulation was pur-
sued as a means to reduce these costs. It is still too early to tell if the
deregulation of private utility companies was a complete success (see
Joskow 1989, 1997). Nonetheless, if history is any guide, it would seem that
to the extent current governance frameworks mirror those that were tried
in the past (i.e., franchise bidding schemes), they too will give way to prob-
lems of corruption.
8.7 Corruption and Municipal Ownership, 1880–1970
Largely a response to concerns about corruption (Glaeser forthcoming),
the move to public ownership was, at least initially, associated with dra-
matic and observable improvements in the operation of utility industries.
In particular, public acquisition was associated with dramatic price reduc-
tions; expansions in service to previously underserved neighborhoods;
and, in the case of water, reduced disease rates especially for poor socio-
economic groups. In terms of the eﬀect of public ownership on prices, con-
sider the following. In 1899 the federal government conducted a survey of
the rates charged by public and private water companies. Including nearly
one-third of all water companies then operating in the United States, the
survey found that the rates charged public water companies were, on aver-
age, 24 percent lower than the rates charged by private companies (U.S.
Commissioner of Labor 1899). However, the discount oﬀered by public
companies varied with size; small public companies oﬀered large discounts
from comparably sized private companies while large public companies
oﬀered little, if any, discount from comparably sized private companies.
Historical time series data suggest the same interpretation: utility prices
fell sharply after public acquisition (see, for example, Thompson 1925).
Formal econometric studies comparing the rates of public and private util-
ity companies during the late twentieth century provide further corrobo-
ration: publicly owned utilities tend to charge lower rates than privately
owned utilities (e.g., Peltzman 1971; Kwoka 2002).
The experiences of Billings, Montana, and New Orleans, Louisiana, il-
lustrate the dramatic improvements in service quality and the reduction in
waterborne disease rates that often followed public acquisition. Before be-
ing taken over by the city, the Billings Water Company had no puriﬁcation
plant and only a limited system of mains. After acquiring the company in
1915, city oﬃcials immediately began raising funds to build a puriﬁcation
plant and extend mains to all areas of Billings (Engineering News, Febru-
ary 18, 1915, p. 365).
In New Orleans, the New Orleans Waterworks Company began opera-
tions in 1878. A private corporation chartered by the State of Louisiana,
274 Werner Troeskenthe company was the exclusive supplier for the portion of New Orleans
located on the north side of the Mississippi River. Court documents and
government investigations indicate that the company distributed water
from the Mississippi unﬁltered. Because thousands of municipalities up-
stream of New Orleans dumped raw and untreated sewage into the Mis-
sissippi, failure to ﬁlter and chlorinate water generated serious outbreaks
of waterborne diseases such as typhoid fever and infantile diarrhea. In ad-
dition to being tainted by disease, the water distributed by the New Or-
leans Waterworks Company was visibly muddy. Consequently, almost no
one used the water for drinking, and instead most city residents purchased
bottled water or used cisterns to collect rainwater. When the National
Board of Fire Underwriters visited New Orleans at the turn of the century,
they found the city’s water system wholly inadequate, and recommended
the city take immediate steps to extend mains and increase the number of
ﬁre hydrants.
During the 1890s, residents of New Orleans grew so dissatisﬁed with the
high rates, poor service, and rampant political corruption associated with
the New Orleans Waterworks Company that they began pushing to have
the company’s charter revoked. These eﬀorts were successful, and the state
supreme court appointed a receiver to liquidate the company’s assets in
1901. The city initiated proceedings to acquire the New Orleans Water-
works Company in 1903 and acquired the water system in 1908.15
Soon after the city acquired the water company, there was an unprece-
dented expansion in service. Miles of water mains per 10,000 persons grew
by a factor of 4.5 between 1905 and 1915. Besides extending mains to all
areas of the city, local oﬃcials also installed a water ﬁltration system im-
mediately after acquiring the waterworks in 1908—the new ﬁltering system
employed sedimentation, coagulation, slow sand ﬁltration, and mechani-
cal ﬁltration. The installation of ﬁlters and the extensions in service re-
duced waterborne disease rates in New Orleans. In the years before the city
municipalized the water system, typhoid rates in the city rose steadily, but
after the system was municipalized in 1908, the trend was reversed and ty-
phoid rates began a permanent downward trend (Troesken 2001).
But the initial beneﬁts of public acquisition eventually gave way to prob-
lems as politicians began using municipally owned utility systems to win
short-term political payoﬀs and in the process allowed the associated in-
frastructure to deteriorate. In particular, investments in patronage and un-
remunerative rate structures steadily displaced investments in upkeep and
new equipment. Nathan Matthews, a Boston mayor, lent credence to this
hypothesis as early as 1894 when he argued that local politicians derived
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15. This paragraph is based on the following sources: State v. New Orleans Waterworks
Company107 La. 1 (1901); New Orleans, Water Puriﬁcation;and National Board of Fire Un-
derwriters, New Orleans.electoral beneﬁts by setting water rates at municipal plants below those
that would have prevailed at private plants: “there have been deliberate at-
tempts in various cities . . . to reduce rates below the point of proﬁt . . . for
the mere purpose of deriving some temporary popularity for the adminis-
tration that happens to be in power” (Matthews 1894, p. 3). Matthews be-
lieved that this practice would, in the long run, undermine the ﬁnancial vi-
ability municipal utilities and city ﬁnances, and delay the construction of
needed improvements in utility systems.
In terms of using employment at municipal utilities to garner political
support, there is much historical evidence to suggest that patronage was a
serious problem. Exploiting a sample of nearly 90,000 workers in turn-of-
the-century America, Troesken (1999) provides evidence that in cities
where patronage was widespread, state and local employees earned 40 per-
cent more per hour, worked 16 to 17 percent fewer hours, and earned 22
percent more per week than comparable workers in the private sector. Sim-
ilarly, a study conducted by the National Civic Federation—a lobbying
group that strongly favored municipal ownership—claimed that municipal
employees often had to pay sizable annual assessments to incumbent
politicians. Such assessments were intended to defray the costs of local
elections. Workers that failed to pay their assessments were ﬁred. Data re-
ported by the National Civic Federation suggest that the size of assess-
ments ranged between 2 and 4 percent of a worker’s annual salary depend-
ing on the worker’s occupation (National Civic Federation 1907, pp. 488–
92).
In addition, the federation found that employees of publicly owned util-
ities were often required to work in local elections. Politicians also hired
more workers than needed just so that they would have more supporters
come election time. Conditions at the Wheeling Gas Company, a munici-
pally owned and operated ﬁrm, were described as follows (National Civic
Federation 1907, p. 492):
The Superintendent of the Gas Works requires his employees to assist in
the primaries and the elections. It is partly on account of the political
usefulness of these gas workers that the Superintendent has employed
about 20 per cent more men than are needed to do the work. He makes
his appointments as much as possible to conciliate the Councilmen.
Elsewhere the same gas plant was characterized as follows (National Civic
Federation 1907, p. 156):
The management is honeycombed with politics. Appointments in the
gas department are parceled out and controlled by the councilmen. All
employees are supposed to belong to the party in power. Should that
party change, it is probably true that the whole force in the department
would change. All employees are regularly assessed for campaign pur-
poses . . . the assessment ranging from $2 to $75.
276 Werner TroeskenThe National Civic Federation (1907, pp. 149–52) found the same level of
patronage and political inﬂuence at the municipally owned and operated
gas works in Philadelphia.
The cumulative eﬀect of patronage and unproﬁtable rate structures was
a long-term decline in service quality. By the late 1970s, municipally owned
water systems in the United States were in such disrepair that many were
unable to meet federal guidelines for water quality. The response to this was
privatization; by privatizing these systems oﬃcials hope to inject new cap-
ital and life into urban water supplies, in much the same way that munici-
palization had done some ﬁfty to seventy years earlier.
The long-term eﬀects of patronage and low rates has been made clear in
a recent paper by Paul Gertler and his coauthors. Galiani, Gertler, and
Schargrodsky (2005) describe the motivation and eﬀects for privatization
of municipal water systems in Argentina. They show that municipal com-
panies had such bloated payrolls that those companies were unable even to
replace or repair existing water mains when they burst. As a result, whole
urban neighborhoods were often without water service for weeks at a time.
Infant mortality rates from diarrheal diseases were high until the water sys-
tems were privatized and patronage employment eliminated. Galiani,
Gertler, and Schargrodsky show that infant mortality rates fell by as much
as 25 percent following privatization and that these reductions were par-
ticularly large for the poorest segments of society.
8.8 Alternative Interpretations
There are at least two other plausible explanations for the circular his-
tory of public utility regulation. One possibility is that regulatory regimes
changed in response to technological changes. For example, perhaps gas
and electric utilities were deregulated during the 1980s and 1990s because
technological changes altered the cost structure of producing these com-
modities. There are three problems with this interpretation. First, while
one might be able to identify technological changes in the production of
electricity that made the industry more competitive (Joskow 1989; White
1996), it is diﬃcult to identify similar changes taking place in the gas and
water industries. Second, there exists an historical counterexample. Dur-
ing the nineteenth century there were, in fact, technological innovations
that lowered the ﬁxed costs associated with manufacturing lighting gas.
These technological changes induced much entry in the gas industry in the
short run, but in the long run they played a central role in promoting more
aggressive forms of municipal and state regulation (Troesken 1996, pp. 21–
57). Third, the deregulation and privatization of gas, electricity, and water
occurred at the same time as deregulation in airlines, trucking, banking,
telecommunications, railroads, cable television, and brokerage services
(Winston 1993, 1998). It seems unlikely that such a large and diverse group
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regulation less attractive.
This third point—that simultaneous regime change was observed across
a wide spectrum of industries—is strong evidence in favor of an explana-
tion rooted in ideological change. In particular, during the late twentieth
century, policymakers and voters began to prefer market-oriented solu-
tions to problems and pushed for deregulation and privatization. By the
same token, during the early twentieth century, the rise of Progressive Era
politics was associated with a preference for state-centered solutions to
problems. As a result, municipalization and state regulation grew increas-
ingly common. One needs to ask, however, why ideology was changing.
Was there a shift in preferences independent of some underlying economic
or political pathology? While there is room for debate on this question,
there is much evidence to suggest that ideological changes about the proper
role of the state in regulating public utilities were driven by genuine dissat-
isfaction with the operation of utility markets. For example, the discussion
above shows that voters began demanding state regulation of gas and elec-
tric utilities in response to real problems associated with various forms of
municipal regulation. By the same token, it is clear that the deregulation
and privatization waves of the 1980s were a response to a growing body of
evidence showing that regulation and public ownership had failed on sev-
eral important margins (Winston 1993, 1998).
8.9 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, it is useful to contrast the ﬁndings of Galiani, Gertler, and
Schargrodsky (2005) and with my own research (Troesken 2001). Galiani,
Gertler, and Schargrodsky present clear and incontrovertible evidence that
privatizing water systems in Latin America had a large and beneﬁcial eﬀect
on waterborne disease rates and that these beneﬁts were particularly large
for the poor. In contrast, my research shows that municipal acquisitions in
the United States some 100 years earlier had the same eﬀect: they reduced
waterborne disease rates substantially, and this was particularly true for
the poor (Troesken 2001). How does one reconcile the ﬁndings of Galiani
and colleagues with my earlier work? Or more precisely, why would one ex-
pect privatization to reduce waterborne disease rates in one context and
municipalization (the exact opposite process) to reduce disease rates in an-
other context?
This paper has oﬀered one possible avenue of reconciliation. Based on
the historical evidence presented above it appears that corruption, and the
necessity to eliminate corruption when it gets too costly, accounts for the
eﬃcacy of regime change. In this context, the direction of regime change—
from public to private, or private to public—is of second-order impor-
tance. What matters is some radical reshuﬄing of the institutional matrix
278 Werner Troeskento disrupt the underlying corrupt relationships. Unfortunately, this disrup-
tion is only temporary, and gradually new forms of corruption emerge and
must again be broken down by institutional change.
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